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The AseAn Dispute settlement 
system
Locknie Hsu
1. Introduction
Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has been an important regional 
association. It is active in promoting trade liberalization and political 
stability. ASEAN members have, through the years, signed several 
treaties to promote trade and investment activities in the region.
Of the numerous ASEAN legal milestones, the most significant 
and recent one is the ASEAN Charter. Its signing in 2007 coincided 
with ASEAN’s 40th year of existence. The Charter adds to the legal 
infrastructure of the organization, including elements relating to 
dispute settlement. It is, however, by no means the only significant 
treaty of ASEAN, as a number of other agreements had already set 
up important legal commitments in the areas of trade and investment 
liberalization and integration.
ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms deal with a variety of 
issues. By way of overview, this chapter begins by introducing major 
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The AseAn Dispute settlement system 
aspects of the dispute settlement system of ASEAN, pre-Charter and 
in light of the Charter. The chapter discusses briefly the over-arching 
dispute settlement mechanisms under the ASEAN Charter, after which 
it focuses on ASEAN’s dispute settlement mechanisms for resolving 
investment and trade disputes. For the former type of dispute, the 
mechanisms are contained in more than one investment treaty, and 
these will be discussed. For the latter type of disputes, the key 
document which will be discussed is the Protocol on Enhanced 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (“DSM”). Investment and trade 
dispute settlement mechanisms forms the main focus of this chapter, 
as they are key mechanisms supporting the ASEAN economic 
integration objective, and are therefore the most relevant to the efforts 
to accelerate the realization of the ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC). Finally, the chapter makes a number of recommendations to 
improve these mechanisms and their support systems and to pave 
the way for their use if necessary in enforcing the various trade and 
investment liberalization commitments of ASEAN members in building 
the AEC.
2. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
This milestone treaty was signed in February 1976 and is one of the 
earliest ASEAN documents with a dispute settlement mechanism. The 
Treaty was established with the following purpose:
to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among 
their peoples which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and 
closer relationship …
One of its cornerstone principles is the settlement of differences or 
disputes by peaceful means. Articles 13 to 17 elaborate on how this 
principle is to be achieved.
A significant dispute settlement body established under these Articles 
is the High Council, comprising a representative of each of the “High 
Contracting Parties” at ministerial level. For disputes not settled by 
negotiations, the High Council may recommend an appropriate means 
of dispute settlement, offer its good offices, constitute itself (with the 
parties’ agreement) into a committee of mediation, inquiry or conciliation, 
and may also recommend “appropriate measures”.
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3. The AseAn Charter and Dispute settlement
The ASEAN Charter took effect on 15 December 2008, introducing 
a separate and over-arching dispute settlement architecture for 
member states. This architecture does not abrogate existing mech-
anisms that pre-date the Charter. Indeed, the Charter expressly 
carves out those disputes that might be subject to specific other 
agreements of ASEAN.1 Since the signing of the Charter, its dispute 
settlement system has been given further structure and detail in the 
form of the Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms, signed in April 2010 (the Charter system).2 This Protocol 
provides important elaboration on the dispute settlement aspects 
of the Charter. It provides 21 articles on dispute settlement matters, 
as well as four annexes dealing with rules relating respectively 
to the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and arbitration.3 
The Charter itself contains a number of specific provisions that 
pertain to dispute settlement. These are found in Articles 22 to 
28. The following are features of the system envisaged in these 
Articles. Among the broad key principles of the Charter are “reliance 
on peaceful settlement of disputes”, “adherence to the rule of law, 
good governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional 
government” and “adherence to multilateral trade rules and 
ASEAN’s rules-based regimes …”.4 To help achieve the aims of the 
Charter and realize its principles, the Charter establishes the ASEAN 
Coordinating Council, which is comprise of the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers. This Council has a role in the new dispute settlement 
landscape.
The Charter recognizes a variety of dispute settlement methods, 
ranging from “dialogue, consultation and negotiation” to reference 
of “unresolved” disputes to the ASEAN Summit, the highest political 
decision-making body. Forming a new “umbrella’ structure on 
dispute settlement, the Charter recognizes pre-existing dispute 
settlement mechanisms established in other ASEAN instruments. 
Where such other mechanisms exist (such as in the area of economic 
agreements, for which there is the DSM), the Charter carves out such 
disputes and gives way to those mechanisms. Where they do not 
exist, however, the Charter envisages the use of a separate, specific 
Charter-based dispute settlement system to resolve remaining disputes.5
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To summarize, the Charter divides the dispute settlement systems 
of ASEAN as follows:6
summary of AseAn Charter system of Dispute settlement
(as explained in Articles 24–26 of the Charter and the 2010 Protocol)
• Disputes relating to specific ASEAN instruments — to be settled 
under those instruments
• Disputes which do not concern interpretation or application of 
any ASEAN instrument — to be settled under the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation
• Where not otherwise specifically provided for, disputes which 
concern interpretation or application of ASEAN economic 
agreements — to be settled in accordance with the DSM
• Disputes concerning interpretation or application of the ASEAN 
Charter itself, of other instruments with no specific means of 
dispute settlement, or of other ASEAN instruments which expressly 
provide that the 2010 Protocol or part thereof shall apply, or 
disputes in which Parties mutually agree that the 2010 Protocol 
shall apply — to be settled by the system set out in the 2010 
Protocol
• “Unresolved disputes” (whose meaning is explained in the 2010 
Protocol) — to be referred to ASEAN Summit for decision
Meaning of “Unresolved Disputes”
One category of disputes that may be referred to political leaders is that 
of “unresolved disputes”. Article 26 of the Charter refers to a situation 
when “a dispute remains unresolved, after the application of the preceding 
provisions of this Chapter …”. In such cases, the Article provides for 
referral of the dispute to the ASEAN Summit, which is comprised of 
political leaders. The 2010 Protocol, however, explains that for a dispute 
to fall within this category, the dispute must fulfill certain criteria.7
Further, Article 27 of the Charter provides that compliance with 
the findings, recommendations or decisions resulting from “an ASEAN 
dispute settlement mechanism” (which, therefore, need not be that of the 
Charter) is monitored at the level of the Secretary-General, Secretariat 
or other designated ASEAN body, and non-compliance may result in 
referral of the dispute to the ASEAN Summit. However, as the meaning 
of an “unresolved dispute” has been defined narrowly by the 2010 
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Protocol, and Article 2 of the 2010 Protocol carves out disputes which 
concern the interpretation or application of other ASEAN instruments 
where “specific means of settling such disputes have already been 
provided for”, not all trade and investment disputes will be referable 
to the Summit, since the dispute may not qualify as “unresolved” as 
defined, and those disputes might also be subject to other specific 
surveillance mechanisms.8
However, conversely, it would appear that even a trade or invest-
ment dispute that remains “unresolved” (for example, in the sense that, 
post-adjudication under the trade/investment agreement, a violation still 
remains) could be referred to the ASEAN Summit if the criteria of an 
“unresolved dispute” are met.
4. AseAn Trade and Investment Dispute settlement
ASEAN treaties provide two separate, parallel regimes for the settle-
ment of trade and investment disputes. Together, the two regimes 
provide opportunities to obtain redress for any non-compliance or non-
implementation by an ASEAN member of trade or investment treaty 
obligations. Both systems contain adjudicatory features in a rules-based 
context, while addressing different types of commitments.
4.1 ASEAN Investment Dispute Settlement
For investment-related disputes, the relevant treaties containing 
dispute settlement mechanisms under the ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement (2009), ACIA 2009 which has now superseded 
its predecessor agreements, namely, the Framework Agreement on 
the ASEAN Investment Area (1998) and the ASEAN Agreement for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments (1987). The ACIA 2009 
provides ASEAN members with the possibility of state-to-state dispute 
resolution. In addition, private investors also have a right of claim 
under some ASEAN investment treaties.
Dispute Settlement under the 1987 Agreement
The 1987 treaty contained important investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanisms. As these involve private investors these mechanisms raise 
somewhat different issues.9 Such recourse provided investors a direct 
means of seeking redress from an ASEAN state which is thought not 
to be in compliance with its investment obligations. The implication of 
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such a means of recourse was that the investor did not need to rely 
on its home state to decide to take up the dispute against the host 
state (alleged to be non-compliant) on its behalf. This mode of dispute 
settlement has so far been utilized once in ASEAN.
In Yaung Chi Oo v Myanmar, an investor based in Singapore, 
instituted arbitration proceedings under the 1987 Agreement against 
Myanmar for alleged violations of that treaty.10 Myanmar argued that 
the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute. Due to the tribunal’s 
interpretation of the scope and requirements of the Agreement, it 
agreed and ruled that it lacked jurisdiction. Hence, while the ASEAN 
investor-state mechanism has been invoked, the case never proceeded 
beyond the jurisdictional challenge to a full hearing on the merits. 
This is to be contrasted with the investor-state arbitration mechanism 
provided for under the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
which has been used frequently since its inception.11
Dispute Settlement under the 1998 Framework Agreement
While the 1998 Framework Agreement did not include an investor-
State mechanism, it (and the other two above Agreements) provides a 
number of specific treaty commitments to protect investors. However, 
the Framework Agreement does provide in Article 17 for intra-ASEAN 
state disputes relating to it to be referred to the trade dispute settlement 
mechanism, discussed below.
Dispute Settlement under the ACIA 2009
The ACIA 2009 contains two dispute settlement mechanisms: a State-
to-State mechanism and an investor-state arbitration mechanism. Unlike 
the DSM (applicable to ASEAN trade disputes, discussed below) there 
is no formal surveillance mechanism within the ACIA 2009 system 
to ensure implementation of an award or a ruling is made. Instead, 
the ASEAN Investment Area Council has general authority to oversee 
implementation of the 2009 Agreement (under Article 42). Under the 
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, the tribunal appointed 
may in certain cases request a “joint interpretation” of any provision 
of the Agreement that is in dispute.12 This provision follows those in 
certain recent FTAs. If a joint decision on interpretation by members is 
arrived at, the tribunal will be bound by it and any decision or award 
by it must be consistent with the joint decision. This has the potential 
of detracting from a rules-based approach to tribunal decisions and 
awards, as the ultimate interpretation may be a political rather than 
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legal one. On the other hand, it may be said that if all the members 
by consensus arrive at the interpretation, such an interpretation reflects 
their intention as the original signatories to the treaty, and should be 
given effect.
At the end of 2011, the ACIA 2009 had not been fully ratified by 
all ASEAN members.13 However, it was announced at the April 2012 
ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, that the ACIA 2009 had 
entered into force with effect from 29 March 2012.14 Its entry into force 
brings about termination of the 1987 and 1998 Agreements (by virtue 
of Article 47 of the ACIA 2009). The ACIA 2009 contains expanded 
investment protection commitments, as well as a revamped and more 
self-contained set of investor-state dispute settlement provisions.
4.2 ASEAN Trade Dispute Settlement
Economic disputes arising from specified economic treaties fall under 
the purview of the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism 2004 (referred to in this chapter as the “Protocol” and its 
mechanism as “the DSM” system).15 This mechanism bears several 
striking similarities with that under the World Trade Organization’s 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), such as a panel procedure, 
findings and recommendations that may be made by panels, as well 
as provisions allowing suspension of concessions (often referred to as 
retaliatory measures) and the possibility of appellate review. Under 
the Protocol, a significant role is given to the ASEAN Senior Economic 
Officials Meeting (SEOM). In several respects the functions of SEOM 
resemble those of the Dispute Settlement Body under DSU. However, 
as will be seen in the following discussion, the Protocol system also 
contains a number of important differences from that of the DSU. This 
will be elaborated on below. The focus of the remaining discussion 
will be on the Protocol and its role in the treatment of trade barriers 
or issues that may impede ASEAN economic integration.
5. AseAn Trade Dispute settlement — Assessment and 
Challenges
5.1. Structural Strengths and Weaknesses
The current dispute settlement system post-ASEAN Charter comprises 
the mechanisms mentioned in the Charter itself, and the separate 
dispute settlement systems provided for in other pre-Charter ASEAN 
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legal instruments. Together they now provide the infrastructure for the 
systematic settlement of disputes that may arise in different contexts 
and under different agreements. Of greatest interest in this study of 
the legal infrastructure of dispute settlement that can facilitate establish-
ment of the AEC by 2015 is the Protocol.
The Protocol establishes a dispute settlement structure that is modelled 
on the WTO DSU system: there are, therefore, relatively clear steps 
spelt out in the dispute settlement process, with specific time frames at 
various stages. Access is equally available to any ASEAN member state 
that has a dispute with another member state involving an agreement 
covered under the Protocol. To the extent that the Protocol incorporates 
familiar features, it lends comfort to potential users who may know 
how the DSU system works.
On the other hand, this may also inadvertently “import” similar 
shortcomings in the DSU system. For instance, the DSU’s silence on 
amicus curiae briefs led to vociferous objections by some members 
when such briefs first appeared in DSU proceedings. As a result, WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body had to devise working procedures to 
deal with them in an acceptable way. The Protocol is similarly silent, 
and questions of how a DSM panel or Appellate Body will deal with 
any such submissions should they find their way into an ASEAN 
trade dispute.
In addition, the infrastructure of the DSM may be hampered due 
to weak financial and institutional support. Although the Protocol intro-
duces the notion of a DSM Fund to take care of panel and Appellate 
Body expenses and administrative costs of the ASEAN Secretariat, the 
Fund does not seek to build human (e.g., by way of legal expertise and 
translation services) and physical infrastructure (e.g., hearing and other 
building facilities at the Jakarta Secretariat) in support of the DSM.
These are preliminary observations. The following will examine the 
Protocol and DSM system in greater detail.
5.2 Major Features of the DSM
In 1996, a Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism was first signed 
by ASEAN leaders in Manila.16 This first iteration of the DSM system 
contained a basic panel and appellate process. It was superseded in 2004 
by the Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism, signed by 
leaders in Vientiane.17 The present enhanced DSM system in the 2004 
08 Aec.indd   389 10/14/13   11:49:40 AM
Protocol was established as a result of recommendations made by a 
High Level Task Force (HLTF) on ASEAN Economic Integration.
The DSM system is modelled after the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Understanding System. However, as will be seen later, there are some 
significant differences. In addition, the ASEAN system provides another 
“layer” of dispute resolution in the form of the ASEAN Compliance 
Body. This is a peer adjudication process.18
The 2004 Protocol’s preamble refers to establishing “practical, 
effective and credible mechanisms” to resolve disputes, and to the 
“transformation” of ASEAN “into a rules-based organization”. While 
the legal infrastructure for resolution of various types of disputes 
between/among ASEAN members now exists, it remains to be seen to 
what extent members will resort to it, and the reasons for hesitation 
to make use of it.19
The DSM only envisages participation by ASEAN states. It, 
therefore, does not permit private entities or investors to participate 
in the adjudicatory process. This is similar to the WTO’s DSU system, 
which only permits WTO member states to participate as complainants, 
respondents and third parties.
The DSM is, therefore, a dedicated dispute settlement system for 
ASEAN members to resolve trade disputes arising under the covered 
ASEAN economic agreements. The 1996 iteration of the DSM was 
established a year after the coming into being of the WTO itself. The 
timing suggests that ASEAN members wished to have a parallel dispute 
settlement system for disputes relating to ASEAN economic agreements. 
Where an allegation of a violation relates to a unique ASEAN agreement 
commitment — as opposed to a commitment that also occurs under 
a WTO agreement — the DSM would be the appropriate forum for 
the dispute. In such a case, the ASEAN DSM is separate from and 
independent of the WTO system.
Where, however, an alleged violation relates both to an ASEAN 
agreement commitment and to a WTO commitment, a choice between 
the two forums would be available; this appears to be confirmed by 
Art. 1 of the Protocol. In such a situation, the DSM appears to provide 
an alternative forum to the WTO DSU system.
Profile of ASEAN Members
ASEAN is made up primarily of developing and least developed 
countries. The officials struggle to cope with ongoing discussions, 
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negotiations and understanding of developments in WTO and other 
international trade bodies, including disputes and the often complex 
legal implications of their outcomes. They also have to deal with 
an increasing number of obligations under bilateral and regional 
agreements. This is in addition to negotiating the ASEAN-wide (and 
therefore labor-intensive) trade agreements with ASEAN’s trade 
partners — the latest being those with the EU.20 The limited legal 
resources in the public sector are strained to cope with the above as 
well as additional DSMs apart from the WTO.21 It needs to be borne 
in mind that there are significantly differing levels in development, 
familiarity with international law, treaty obligations and implement-
ation, education and training resources in trade matters in the ASEAN 
members. Currently, the terms of the DSM do not appear to take into 
account these differences in a significant manner (whereas by contrast, 
the WTO DSU system contains several provisions taking into account 
the development status of members).
5.3 The WTO DSU System and the ASEAN DSM System —  
What Lessons Can Be Drawn and What Recommendations  
May Be Made?
Use of the ASEAN DSM and WTO DSU Systems by ASEAN 
Members
The main trade dispute mechanism used by ASEAN members is that 
of the WTO. The system was established under the WTO’s Under-
standing on Dispute Settlement (“DSU”) in 1995 at the birth of the 
organization and has, as at the time of writing, already seen 427 
disputes brought to it.22
A small number of intra-ASEAN trade disputes were settled amicably 
without the parties having to proceed to formal panel hearings in 
dispute settlement, either under the DSM or the DSU system.
The first such complaint that was settled was one raised under the 
WTO DSU system. The complaint was initiated by Singapore against 
Malaysia — two ASEAN countries — regarding the prohibition of 
imports of polyethylene and polypropylene instituted and maintained 
by the Malaysian Government under the Customs (Prohibition of 
Imports) (Amendments) (No. 5) Order 1994 dated 16 March 1994. 
Although Singapore requested establishment of a panel, this never 
proceeded to a panel hearing as the matter was eventually settled and 
the complaint was withdrawn completely.23
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In 2001, Thailand and Malaysia held consultations over Malaysia’s 
delay in phasing certain automative products from its Temporary 
Exclusion List to its Inclusion List. The countries settled the matter 
amicably through consultations without resorting to formal dispute 
settlement procedures. In 2003, Singapore held consultations with the 
Philippines over a complaint relating to the Philippines’ implementation 
of the AFTA’s Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme (CEPT). 
The complaint was regarding a suspension of tariff reductions by 
the Philippines for certain petrochemical goods. Again, after consulta-
tions, this matter was eventually settled without any formal dispute 
settlement panel being established; the Philippines first entered into 
a compensatory arrangement with Singapore in August 2003, and 
subsequently lifted the tariff-reduction suspension altogether in 2006.24
From 1995 to the present, WTO members from ASEAN which have 
either initiated a complaint or acted as a responde in a dispute under 
this system are: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
Singapore and Viet Nam have so far only participated as complainants 
but not as respondents. In addition, ASEAN countries have participated 
as third parties in numerous other WTO disputes.25
As recently as 2011, the Philippines and Thailand were involved 
in a WTO dispute over Thai fiscal and customs measures affecting 
cigarettes from the Philippines.26
The DSM and the DSU
While at first sight the DSM system created under the Protocol appears 
to bear striking similarities with the WTO’s system created under 
its DSU, there are in fact several significant differences. This section 
provides a critical comparison of the two systems.
When one examines the texts of the Protocol and the DSU, 
important differences between the two systems are observed. While 
some differences are due to the obvious contextual differences (such 
as ASEAN substituting the SEOM for the DSU) others appear to be 
deliberate, legal differences. Differences arising from the Protocol can 
lead to potential legal uncertainty and unsatisfactory operation of the 
DSM in practice.
One example is that found in the area of confidentiality at the stage 
of consultations. It is now known why the confidentiality provision 
in the DSM for its consultations was not emulated in the Protocol. 
Likewise, while the Protocol copies the DSU in providing for conciliation 
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and good offices, again, it has omitted the important confidentiality 
provision present in the DSU counterpart provision.
A more serious difference is seen in Art. 1 of the Protocol. The DSU 
system permits only disputes relating to the “covered agreements” of 
the WTO to be brought under it, and WTO members are required 
to submit their WTO disputes to that system.27 The DSU does not 
envisage use of alternative forums to resolve disputes pertaining to 
its “covered agreements”.
By contrast, the ASEAN Protocol opens with a provision that 
envisages use of alternative forums:
ARTICLE 1 
Coverage and Application
3. The provisions of this Protocol are without prejudice to the rights 
of Member States to seek recourse to other fora for the settlement of 
disputes involving other Member States. A Member State involved in a 
dispute can resort to other fora at any stage before a party has made a 
request to the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (“SEOM”) to establish 
a panel pursuant to paragraph 1 Article 5 of this Protocol.
This provision is worded broadly and refers to “disputes involving 
other Member States”. This potentially includes disputes that fall within 
this Protocol, i.e., pertain to its “covered agreements”. A choice therefore 
exists for Member States to opt for other forums (such as the WTO’s 
DSU system, if the dispute also falls within its “covered agreements”), 
up to the time of establishment of a panel by the SEOM. The provision 
does not state clearly what might happen to such an alternative action 
initiated in another forum before a request for the establishment of a 
DSM panel is made, but it implies that once such a request is made, 
the choice of forums ends and only the means offered under the 
Protocol will apply. As mentioned, by contrast, the WTO’s DSU does 
not provide for such a choice of dispute settlement forum.28
5.4 Making the ASEAN DSM More Effectively Workable by 2015: 
Factors and Policy Recommendations
In the above discussion and comparison, it can be seen that structurally, 
the ASEAN DSM contains a number of clear procedural features which 
emulate those in the WTO DSU. While the latter still has flaws, it has 
provided members with a working and effective dispute settlement 
institution for over 10 years now.
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As mentioned, a recent dispute settlement report — issued in 
2011 — relates to a trade dispute between two ASEAN members as 
complainant and respondent. Clearly, the Philippines and Thailand have 
demonstrated that they are prepared to have their trade dispute dealt 
with by the WTO.29 If the complaint could also have been brought 
under the DSM as a complaint of violation of part of an ASEAN 
“covered agreement”, would the complainants have brought the dispute 
under the DSM? This would, of course involve examining whether 
the measure(s) in question could have been argued to also violate an 
ASEAN “covered agreement”. In such a case, the answer may not only 
be a legal one but also a strategic and political one. WTO disputes 
receive more international attention, past and present WTO panelists 
and Appellate Body members are known, and the WTO system already 
has a relatively long history (compared with the ASEAN DSM) and 
a series of interpretative statements from past cases. Several factors 
may therefore contribute to the choice of forum, where indeed such 
a choice exists.
One factor which may be difficult to address is the fact that at the 
WTO, members may draw on the support of other WTO members for 
their arguments in a dispute. The DSU system permits a WTO member 
that is not a complainant or respondent and which has a “substantial 
interest” in a case to participate (to an extent) as a third party. More 
than one third party may join the proceedings. Third parties may make 
legal submissions in support of a particular view or in respect of a 
particular point of law in a case.
In the WTO context therefore, an ASEAN WTO member which 
has a dispute against a fellow ASEAN WTO member could generate 
support for its case from fellow WTO members — including non-
ASEAN countries — such as the large economies of the United States 
and the EU. Indeed, in the WTO case between Thailand and the 
Philippines mentioned above, third parties included Australia; the PRC; 
the European Union; India; Taipei,China and the United States.
Under the DSM, while third parties with a “substantial interest” are 
also allowed to participate in the process, such parties would necessarily 
be limited to fellow ASEAN members. Hence, for a given issue in a 
case, less third party support may be available if one were to bring a 
case under the ASEAN DSM.
Apart from other possible reasons for using the WTO system, the 
above examination leads to the identification of at least four specific 
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starting points, explained below, for improving the structure of the 
DSM procedures, as well as ASEAN members’ familiarity with the 
ASEAN DSM.
5.4.1. Legal Certainty
(a)  Identifying and Filling of Gaps
First, a reconsideration of Article 1 of the Protocol is in order, as it 
currently offers a choice of forums should a trade dispute arise between 
ASEAN members which might fall under an ASEAN agreement as well 
as another agreement (such as those under the WTO). As mentioned 
above, this choice may lead to an ASEAN member opting to bring 
such a dispute to the WTO, a “tried and tested” system with more 
than 10 years of “case law” history (and, therefore, known guiding 
principles) by now.
Secondly, there is no equivalent of the important guiding principles 
set out in Art. 3 of the DSU. This includes the DSU philosophy on 
resolution of WTO members’ disputes, and the Article’s specific reference 
to the use of customary international law principles of interpretation 
of treaties. The latter has been expressly applied in several panel and 
Appellate Body decisions of the WTO. This application and visibility 
lends certainty to the interpretative process. It is not clear why at least 
some of the guiding provisions in Art. 3 of the DSU have not been 
incorporated into the Protocol. For greater certainty of the DSM, an 
examination of Article 3 DSU needs to undertaken, to see which parts 
should be included in the Protocol, mutatis mutandis.
In addition, some other gaps in the text of the Protocol exist. 
For instance, there is no time-limit or confidentiality provisions in 
respect of DSM consultations. Another example is the omission of a 
provision on representation on the DSM’s Appellate Body. While the 
WTO’s DSU provides for broad representation of its membership in 
the WTO Appellate Body, this is not the case in the DSM. These are 
important aspects and include omissions on the confidentiality in the 
processes of conciliation and use of good offices, There is a lack of 
special provisions for least developed ASEAN members involved in a 
trade dispute under the DSM.
Finally, the DSM’s Appellate Body does not appear as yet to have 
a set of Working Procedures (the WTO Appellate Body has a set 
and these are updated periodically) or a Code of Conduct. These are 
important for promoting understanding and proper conduct of appeals 
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in the process. Information on the DSM Appellate Body is, therefore, 
incomplete at the moment, and this omission needs to be addressed.
Hence, the DSM can be further improved by studying and including 
any useful procedures already established by the WTO DSU system and 
the rich case practices of WTO, which may be adopted where possible, 
or adapted if necessary, for use in the DSM system.
Recommendation:
The above issues and gaps need to be carefully considered and filled to 
provide a more effective system. Useful procedures already established 
in the WTO DSU system should be considered for incorporation, either 
through adaptation or, where possible, adoption, in the DSM system.
(b)  Transparency of Processes and Dispute Reports
The WTO DSU system has gained a great deal of exposure through 
its case reports and ease of availability of these reports. Many reports 
are complicated, and long and often lead to much debate, but the 
dissemination of these reports encourage knowledge of the system, 
reasoning and interpretative processes used by the panels and the 
Appellate Body.
The various stages and processes of the WTO are also explained 
comprehensively in layman language in its Web pages (including free e-
learning modules, all WTO legal texts, WTO documents and background 
papers). The dissemination of knowledge and ease of access leads to 
greater familiarity among members, decision-makers, legal advisers and 
academics and promotes transparency and confidence in the system.
Recommendation:
The ASEAN website is a useful tool and should be improved to 
likewise provide much more guiding information about all aspects of 
the DSM, to promote transparency and confidence in it among ASEAN 
members.
(c)  Composition of Panels and of the Appellate Body
Currently, the publicly available information on panels and the Appellate 
Body is lacking.
Recommendation:
There should be dissemination of information, for example, making 
available to ASEAN member states an indicative list of panelists, 
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publication of the Appellate Body members’ names and qualifications, 
and, when disputes are raised, there should be prompt dissemination 
and updates of information on these on the Secretariat website.
5.4.2 Legal, Resource and Financial Support
There needs to be better dissemination of information on the available 
support, assistance and advice, especially for less developed ASEAN 
members, as well as strengthening of existing support systems.
(a)  Human and Physical Resources Supporting the  
DSM Process
The HLTF envisaged establishment of a new system by 2004, providing 
for advisory, consultative, and adjudicatory mechanisms as follows:
• Establishment of a legal unit within the ASEAN Secretariat;
 (This unit will provide legal advice on trade disputes)
• Establishment of the ASEAN Consultation to Solve Trade and 
Investment Issues (ACT); (the ACT is the ASEAN equivalent of 
the EU SOLVIT mechanism, set up to provide quick resolution 
of operational problems); and
• Establishment of the ASEAN Compliance Body (ACB) (this is 
modelled after the WTO Textile Monitoring Body and makes 
use of peer pressure); and
• Establishment of the enhanced DSM (to ensure expeditious and 
legally binding decision in resolving trade disputes).30
ASEAN Legal Unit
The HLTF expectations of the Legal Unit are spelt out as follows: 
The ASEAN Legal Unit will be staffed by qualified lawyers specializing 
in trade laws employed by the ASEAN Secretariat. The unit will offer 
legal interpretation/advice on potential trade dispute issues upon 
request from countries. The advice is purely advisory and non-binding 
in nature.
The ACT
This is adapted from the EU SOLVIT mechanism. According to the 
HLTF recommendations:
It is a network of government agencies (one from each country) to 
allow the private sector to cut through red tape and achieve speedy 
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resolution of operational problems encountered, thus helping to create 
a pro-business environment in ASEAN.
Private individuals and businesses faced with operational problems 
related to countries’ ASEAN commitments, either at home or in other 
ASEAN countries, can highlight these problems to the ACT in their 
country (Host ACT). For problems encountered within the home 
country, the Host ACT will direct the problem to the appropriate 
government agencies, and ensure that a proposed solution is sent to 
the individuals/businesses within 30 calendar days. The 2009 ASEAN 
Agreement for Trade in Goods (ATIGA) refers specifically to ACT, the 
ACB as well as the DSM.31
For problems encountered in other ASEAN countries, the Host ACT 
will forward the problem to the other countries’ ACT (Lead ACT). 
The Lead ACT will be responsible for directing the problem to the 
appropriate government agencies in its country, and ensuring that a 
proposed solution is sent to the individuals/businesses via the Host ACT 
within 30 calendar days. To minimize per cent delays, communication 
between Host and Lead ACTs should be via electronic means, for 
instance an online database accessible to all member countries.
The ACB
The ASEAN Compliance Monitoring Body (ACB) makes available a 
non-binding peer review mechanism when a dispute arises. The ACMB 
is modelled after the Textile Monitoring Body of the WTO. Submission 
of a dispute to this body is optional, and a complaining member may 
proceed directly to the procedures provided for under the DSM.
Recommendation:
The above bodies should be adequately staffed and funded to ensure 
that the requisite expert and manpower are available to serve the needs 
of ASEAN members which may need to make use of them to obtain 
legal support to resolve their trade disputes.
(b)  Physical/Technological Facilities
On physical and technological facilities, the WTO has its headquarters 
and Secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland (by no means an inexpensive 
venue), while the ASEAN Secretariat is in Jakarta, Indonesia. The 
implication is that DSM disputes will be administered and heard in 
Jakarta. This means that the physical and electronic infrastructure 
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needs to be able to support hearings of disputes and disputing 
parties’ related needs. Even the WTO building, already much better 
equipped than the ASEAN Secretariat, has been undergoing further 
refurbishment and improvements. As Article 20 of the Protocol provides 
that substantive hearings are to be held at the ASEAN Secretariat in 
Jakarta, it must be ensured that the human and physical resources 
at the Secretariat are adequate and appropriate for hearings of 
DSM disputes.
In this connection, it is a welcome development that the Secretariat 
has recently received more physical space with the addition of two 
buildings next to the existing premises, and it is hoped that the new 
premises will be fitted out with careful thought to provide suitable 
administrative as well as dispute settlement facilities.32
Recommendation: 
ASEAN leaders should initiate a study to examine the adequacy 
and suitability of physical and technological facilities at the ASEAN 
Secretariat’s Jakarta premises. The availability and adequacy of translation 
services for DSM proceedings and related documents should also be 
looked into.
(c)  The Secretariat’s Legal Duties
The High Level Task Force envisaged an expanded legal capacity in 
the Secretariat under the DSM system. As Article 19 of the Protocol 
requires the Secretariat to “have the responsibility of assisting the 
panels and the Appellate Body, especially on the legal, historical and 
the procedural aspects of the matters dealt with, and of providing 
secretariat and technical support” as well as to “assist the SEOM to 
monitor and maintain surveillance of the implementation” of panel 
and Appellate Body reports, it is imperative to ensure that funding is 
available to make this level of assistance and support available.
It is noteworthy too that Article 19 does not — unlike Article 
22 of the DSU — expressly require the Secretariat to provide legal 
advice and assistance to developing country members or to provide 
training on dispute settlement under the DSM system. By contrast, the 
WTO Secretariat is expressly tasked to provide such support, which 
is invaluable, especially to those members which are new to using or 
considering use of the system. As most countries in ASEAN are either 
developing or least developed countries, it is important to provide 
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legal and technical support in intra-ASEAN disputes, where it is most 
needed. It appears, however, that in practice, non-binding legal advice 
may be obtained from the Secretariat’s Agreements and Compliance 
Unit on potential economic disputes.33
While Article 17 of the Protocol interestingly provides for a DSM 
Fund to “meet the expenses of panels and the Appellate Body and 
“any related administration costs of the ASEAN Secretariat”, the CLMV 
countries, for instance, cannot expect to receive any legal assistance 
from the system. They may deserve further attention in this regard, 
for a start. However, it appears that the Agreements and Compliance 
Unit of the Secretariat can give non-binding legal advice.34
Recommendation:
ASEAN members should be made aware of the existing legal assistance 
available in relation to the DSM process.
Apart from the Secretariat, it may be necessary to provide for a 
complementary and full-fledged legal support service, akin to the 
Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL). The ACWL has been providing 
important advisory as well as representational services to developing 
members of the WTO. It is staffed by a team of highly qualified lawyers 
conversant with WTO law and practice and provides a valuable service 
to less developed states that require either legal advice on their laws or 
disputes or actual representation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings 
at highly discounted rates. In the ASEAN context however, there is no 
equivalent to this, and full legal costs have to be borne by ASEAN 
members in the event of a dispute under the DSM. This is confirmed 
under Art. 17.2 of the 2004 Protocol. (While Art. 17 also established a 
DSM Fund, this Fund is intended to cover the expenses of panels and, 
the Appellate Body and related ones of the ASEAN Secretariat.)
Recommendation:
ASEAN leaders should consider establishment and support of an 
advisory and legal service for less developed ASEAN members in the 
area of trade and investment disputes.
5.4.3 DSM — Information and Publicity
For officials of ASEAN grappling with the implications of WTO 
disputes and their legal implications — which has only in the last 
10 years or so begun to provide a basis for understanding the substance 
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and interpretation of WTO rights and obligations, it is a significant 
requirement for these officials to also be familiar with the relatively 
new ASEAN DSM system. It is, therefore, imperative that, for the 
DSM to be useful, all critical information about it should be made 
easily available.
Recommendation:
The following are ways to achieve better and wider dissemination of 
information on the DSM.
(a)  The ASEAN website can be a powerful tool for disseminating 
information about the dispute settlement process.
Currently the website is not known for its ease of navigation and 
searches. Improvements can be made in a variety of ways.
Figure 8.1  
screen Capture of AseAn Home Page as at 16 May 2013
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First, a clear link to a Dispute Settlement Web page that provides 
a one-stop source of DSM information should be created on the 
ASEAN home page. Currently, looking at the ASEAN home page, it is 
not immediately obvious where one might locate information on the 
DSM or its features, as can be seen in the screen capture of the list 
of ASEAN Community links in Figure 8.1.
Recommendation:
A clear link should be inserted in the main home page for a start. In 
addition, in the suggested (new) Dispute Settlement page, a number of 
important links needs to be included. Such links should include:
• All legal documents relating to the DSM, such as the Protocol 
and its predecessor;
• Background and overview information on the DSM, such as the 
HLTF report leading to the creation of the DSM;
• Information on all available avenues of dispute settlement, 
including the ACT, ACMB and DSM;
• User-friendly charts and time-lines of the DSM process;
• Information on assistance available from the Legal Unit and its 
contact particulars;
• Information on an indicative list of panel members, including 
their names, nationalities and relevant qualifications;
• Appellate Body members’ names, nationalities, relevant qualifi-
cations and appointment dates and tenures of appointment; 
• Up-to-date information on any complaints that have been formally 
initiated, and on any panels that may have been requested and 
established; and
• Updates as and when there are important Ministerial or other 
official statements pertaining to the DSM or its use.
• In the longer term, e-training modules could be developed and 
linked to this Web page as well, to facilitate learning about the 
DSM by members.
By way of comparison, the WTO has a “Dispute Settlement Gateway” 
page, which provides vital information and links to all aspects of the 
DSU system. While ASEAN’s trade dispute settlement system is still in 
a state of relative infancy, the Gateway may serve as a useful model on 
the basic types of information and documentary links that are crucial 
to policy-makers, lawyers and researchers.
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The lack of a clear and coherent web-based information system on the 
DSM can be a strong detraction from the usefulness and transparency 
of the DSM system.
(b)  Information for Political Decision-Makers
Recommendation:
Apart from online information, face-to-face information sessions should 
be organized for decision-makers and officials in ASEAN, to further 
familiarize them with the DSM.
Recognizing the limit on the resources of the Secretariat, such sessions 
(as well as development e-training materials mentioned above) can be 
co-organized with neutral institutions and academics familiar with the 
DSM and its functions.
5.4.4 Policy Factors
As ASEAN seeks to introduce more rules-based characteristics to the 
integration mechanisms, a shift in the mindset of leaders — through 
better dissemination of information and strong DSM institutional fea-
tures and support — must take place, to include, beyond the traditional 
“ASEAN Way” of full consensus, the possibility of a different approach 
in the specific area of trade disputes. This is certainly not to suggest 
an abrogation of the long-standing “ASEAN Way”, which has served 
ASEAN well in many respects through the years. Rather, it is a hope 
that it will evolve to accommodate the more active use of a rules-based, 
WTO-like system of dispute settlement that will yield results that are 
fair, certain and satisfactory to parties in the field of trade disputes 
covered by the DSM. Members have already put the infrastructure in 
place and the next shift in thinking must occur at the decision-making 
level when a trade dispute arises.
In addition, in the past, it might have been thought that the DSM 
was a purely politicized system, allowing ASEAN leaders or senior 
ASEAN officials to have ultimate decision-making powers in a trade 
dispute. To the extent that such a belief is an impediment to trust in 
or use of the DSM, it needs to be debunked forcefully.35
Mirroring the spirit and in several provisions, the letter — of 
the WTO DSU system, the DSM establishes a rules-based system. In 
accepting a much more rules-based DSU, the WTO members intended 
that the situation prior to the establishment of WTO (in the era of 
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GATT 1947) of unilateral trade acts and political vetoes over dispute 
resolution should be changed. In like fashion, ASEAN has signalled 
with the DSM that economic disputes between members which remain 
unresolved would have to move beyond political decisions to a rules-
based legal determination and remedies.
A good example of this is found in the WTO’s reverse consensus 
method of decision making, which has been adopted by the 2004 
Protocol, when it comes to adoption of panel or appellate rulings. Under 
the DSU and the DSM, this means that a panel and Appellate Body 
decision is to be adopted by the members acting as the DSB, unless by 
consensus it decides not to do so. When this mechanism was introduced 
in the WTO, it effectively eradicated the possibility that existed under 
the GATT era (i.e., pre-WTO) of non-adoption or unilateral blocking of 
panel decisions. Similarly under the 2004 Protocol, once a panel or the 
Appellate Body has made its decision, the SEOM is obliged to adopt 
it unless all members agree not to do so. The role of SEOM thereafter 
is one of surveillance of the implementation of the decision and is not a 
final appeal body. This resembles the role of the DSB. Another example 
is the mirroring by the Protocol of the DSU’s use of clear deadlines for 
panel and appellate decisions, as well as the retaliation rules.
Given that the DSM is already present and is a rules-based, technical 
system, ASEAN must move beyond the image that it works only by 
consensus.
Recommendation 1: 
ASEAN members and their legal professions and business communities 
should be made aware of the rules-based features of the 2004 Protocol 
and their advantages.
Recommendation 2:
Potential benefits of bringing a DSM dispute — rather than a WTO 
dispute – where a choice exists, should be impressed upon ASEAN 
members and their business communities. Examples could be the 
potentially lower local costs of holding hearings in Jakarta instead of 
Geneva, Switzerland; and the proximity of ASEAN capitals and officials 
to Jakarta than to Geneva and the time saved in travel by officials 
for hearings or meetings. Another example would be the improved, 
shorter deadlines under the DSM as compared with those of the DSU, 
for speedier resolution of trade disputes.
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Recommendation 3:
ASEAN leaders are invited to consider encouraging the teaching of the 
ASEAN trade and investment settlement systems as part of ASEAN 
university courses on international economic law, or on trade and 
investment law, to raise the awareness and understanding among future 
lawyers in the region of these mechanisms and their relevance.
6. Conclusion
While the above specific suggestions should be looked into, it should 
be noted that non-use of the DSM is not in itself a total calamity, as it 
could mean that, for the most part, the integration agreements covered 
by the DSM are working quite smoothly, or that disputes are taken 
care of through non-adversarial means apart from the DSM. 
As ASEAN seeks to introduce more rules-based characteristics to 
the integration mechanisms, a shift in the mindset of leaders and 
officials — through better dissemination of information and strong 
DSM institutional features and support — must take place, they have 
to move beyond the traditional “ASEAN Way” of full consensus in 
certain specific areas where necessary, such as where consultations are 
not successful. This is not to suggest the abrogation of the “ASEAN 
Way”, since consultations — which need not be adversarial and may 
be amicable — are still a key step and component of the DSM dispute 
settlement process. This ensures that disputes may still be settled without 
progressing to more formal and adversarial hearing processes.
Some doubt has been expressed as to whether the new, more rules-
based DSM system is too “legalistic”, and unable to appreciate ASEAN’s 
history and mode of dealings.36 This suggests a possible “disconnect” 
between ASEAN leaders’ aspirations for a more legal rules-based 
system,37 and some officials’ continuing preference for a more informal, 
non-legalistic system. The recent dispute between Thailand and the 
Philippines38 — where the parties were prepared not only to take the 
dispute to WTO dispute settlement but even to final appeal before the 
WTO’s Appellate Body — shows, however, that ASEAN members are 
in fact very much prepared to utilize a rules-based and “legalistic” 
system against each other.
With the WTO and other bilateral or regional agreements having 
their own dispute settlement systems, the DSM is but one possible 
option for ASEAN members who are party to all these, and find that 
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a particular problematic measure may form the subject-matter of more 
than one dispute settlement forum. Where the DSM is an applicable 
mechanism, its current deficiencies should not be allowed to form a 
barrier to members choosing to use it to resolve their trade disputes.
It should also be recognized that while trade dispute settlement 
is not a primary integration tool, it is an important secondary tool that 
supports integration and liberalization efforts. This is because it is a 
legal tool for ensuring that legal commitments carefully negotiated 
and agreed upon by ASEAN members for the purpose of integration 
are both complied with and implemented. To quote the DSU: the 
WTO members “recognize that [the WTO’s dispute settlement system] 
serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the 
covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those 
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law. Recommendations and rules of the DSB cannot 
add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements.”39 Unfortunately, as pointed out earlier, these words (and 
indeed those in the Article it is found in) and their assurances are not 
found in the 2004 Protocol.
It is therefore imperative to ensure that the DSM system is a strong 
and reliable supporting mechanism in the integration process, so that 
ASEAN members may call upon it with confidence and trust should 
the need to use it arise. While the objective would not be to ensure 
actual use of the DSM by 2015, it should certainly be an objective to 
ensure that an operationally ready, structurally comprehensive and easily 
navigable system is in place by then or earlier, so that any dispute 
that arises may be referred to it with the confidence that the case will 
be handled efficiently, transparently and fairly.
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